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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(3) and (5) (2008) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Issue: Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in 
affirming the district court's award of prejudgment interest for the parties' settlement. 
2. Issue: Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in 
holding the inclusion of equitable claims among those settled did not preclude an award 
of prejudgment interest. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment 
interest presents a question of law which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, «| 16, 82 P.3d 1064. "On certiorari review, [the 
Supreme Court] reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the 
district court." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, f 11, 
156P.3d806. 
Preservation of Issue: These issues were preserved through Appellants' pretrial 
memorandum and post trial motion. (R 285-301; 378-86.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations that 
are determinative on the issues on certiorari.1 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, the statute which allows for awards of prejudgment 
interest on liquidated sums does not apply herein for the reasons set forth below. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This lawsuit arose from a dispute concerning whether any additional payment was 
owed for construction performed on the residence of the Defendants/Petitioners (the 
"Gurneys") by Plaintiff/Respondent Iron Head Construction, Inc. ("Iron Head"). Iron 
Head sought to recover substantial sums above and beyond the price set forth in the 
parties' written contract under both contract and equitable theories. However, the 
amounts Iron Head claimed it was owed were internally inconsistent and unsubstan-
tiated—varying widely during construction and before and during trial. The Gurneys 
believe that Iron Head had been paid in full and denied any further obligation to Iron 
Head beyond the amount of the written contract. By the third day of trial, it became 
apparent that a lengthy continuance would be required. At that point, before the Gumeys 
presented any evidence, the parties reached an agreement to settle all claims for the 
compromise sum of $43,500—a nuisance figure to the Gumeys approximating the cost of 
completing the trial and that was neither attributed nor attributable to the evidence in the 
partial record. The Gumeys disputed Iron Head's claim for prejudgment interest, 
however, and the issue of Iron Head's entitlement to such interest was submitted to the 
trial court for decision as a matter of law. 
Even though the $43,500 settlement amount was a new obligation, not defined by 
reference to any facts or figures produced by Iron Head and not established by judgment 
or stipulation by the Gumeys admitting liability, the trial court awarded Iron Head 
prejudgment interest on the compromise sum calculated from December 31, 2000—a 
2 
i 1 jjiiui to the filing of the 
Complaint. The Court ol Appeals affirmed in Inm Head Como uefion. Inc. v. Gurney, 
200R T T App * * ^r P.3d 453, a ? • I d^ IN^II, W ith Judge Oriiie issuing a dissenting and. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Iron I lead filed suit on January 5, 2001 to collect payment of amounts beyona j.v 
contract price for" work d, 
il ill i iiiisrs of action I I oreaui oi contract, \2) quantum tnetuil, (3; jurist rnndimet]!, 
.__ * -4 • foreclosure of a nicchaua/s lien TK . | -X ) The Gurneys answered, disputing 
each ot ln-i t u;uu s claims ai.,, ..,. *. - -. uiiii1. iiiii Iron 
i e than what was due to Iron Head under the contract. 
v^. . ~ - J inal followed. 
On the third day of trial, the parties agreed lo \etlL .ill i Liiirt lui (In1 uiihiiHiiiiLse 
11 'i,S00 .il'ici H breamr appau ill llii.il lln; detailed trial evidence could not be 
completed within the allotted time and thai trial would need to be recommenced rnoi iths 
later at considerable cost. (R. 315-316; 332-33.) At tl lat time, Iron Head was still 
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1
 The trial court's prejudgnien; du^ ...;,i decision is memorialized in three separate 
orders/judgments. The first order, appearing at R. 387-89, was signed by the trial court 
on December 16, 2003 and entered December 17, 2003 (hereafter "December 17 Order," 
attached as Appendix A), The second order,, appearing at R. 390-93, was signed by the 
trial court on April 13, 2004 and entered April 14, 2004 (hereafter "April 14 Order," 
attached as Appendix B). The third order is the final judgment in this case. It appears at 
R, 440-42, and was signed and entered by the trial court on August 11, 2006 (hereafter 
"August 11 Judgment," attached as Appendix C). The trial court's substantive rulings on 
prejudgment interest appear in the December 17 and April 14 Orders. 
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93.) Iron Head requested an award of prejudgment interest on the settlement amount. 
The Gurneys did not agree that Iron Head was entitled to prejudgment interest on this 
new obligation, and the parties submitted the issue of such entitlement for as a decision 
by the trial court as a matter of law. (R.323-36; 378-86.) 
On December 16, 2003, following briefing, but without oral argument, the trial 
court awarded Iron Head prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% per annum on the 
compromise sum of $43,500, calculated from December 31, 2000 until the date of 
settlement on November 13, 2003, a total amount of $12,835.48. (Appendix A.) The 
Gurneys paid the agreed settlement amount in full. They disputed, however, the award of 
prejudgment interest, which was reduced to a final judgment much later, on August 11, 
2006. (Appendix C.) 
The Gumeys appealed the judgment awarding prejudgment interest to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, asserting three main points of error with the trial court's decision. 
First, the Gumeys argued that prejudgment interest may not be based on the compromise 
sum paid to settle the lawsuit with Iron Head because prejudgment interest may only be 
awarded where "damages are complete and can be measured by fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,f17, 82 P.3d 
1064 (quotations and citation omitted). Here, there was no determination of liability, no 
admission of fault, no damages proven or stipulated to, and no judgment on the 
underlying claims entered against the Gumeys. The $43,500 settlement amount was not 
traceable to any amount billed or any evidence produced, but rather was arrived at anew, 
on November 13, 2003, as a mutually disadvantageous point at which to compromise the 
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The majority first concluded that prejudgment interest co..„. . .,i . , , . . . . . . .. ... nent 
prejudgment interest to 
the trial court for decision. Iron Head v. Gurney, 2008 U'l * App 1 at |^ l>. Hie majority 
next determined that "damages" were calculable with mat! lematical accuracy, although 
none were awarded and lion lit fid's dumitvi ilaiiiis "turn 111111,11 iiitll11! iiin iiiisiskiii because 
"'a fMCI tinder could have determined any damage amount based on the evidence 
presented " Id. at 'f 20 The majority ignored that the trial record was not complete and 
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susceptible to determination by the trier of fact, lacking any evidence at all from the 
Gurneys. The majority also found the "damages" fixed as of a particular date— 
December 31, 2000—even though "the trial court is not authorized to make findings 
without a trial," id. at \ 21, because it was "undisputed" that no further construction was 
performed after an early December meeting between the parties, even though no further 
billing was presented to the Gumeys at that time. Id. 
In approving prejudgment interest for Iron Head's equitable claims, the majority 
relied on (a) its decision in Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 265, 269-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
allowing prejudgment interest for quantum meruit; and (b) cases allowing prejudgment 
interest for breach of fiduciary duty claims. Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at fflf 14-16. The 
majority distinguished prior precedent which disallowed prejudgment interest on 
equitable claims by limiting those cases to their facts. Id. at f^ j 17-19. 
Judge Orme dissented because Iron Head failed to meet its burden of showing its 
entitlement to prejudgment interest. Id. at f 26. Specifically, Judge Orme observed that 
the "rather round sum of $43,500" is not attributable to any evidence offered, but rather 
"is—not unlike an award for pain and suffering or damage to reputation—a figure that 
has essentially been plucked from the air, albeit by the parties rather than the jury." Id. at 
Tf 25. The prejudgment interest award, he wrote, should be "vacated" because one 
"cannot tell how much of the settlement amount, if any, is for the kind of thing that may 
3
 See Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); and Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy 
Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 P.2d 222. 
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warrant an award of prejudgment interest and how much reflects the range of 
imponderables inherent in any settlement decision." Id. at j^ 26. 
The Gurneys filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 4, 2008. This 
Court granted the Petition on April 17, 2008 as to the two issues identified above. 
Statement of Facts 
1. In early 2000, the Gurneys hired Iron Head to perform certain construction 
and remodel work on the on the Gurneys' residence pursuant to a written contract for a 
fixed sum of $168,558.00.4 (R. 285, 298; 335.) 
2. Iron Head presented only three invoices to the Gurneys after construction 
began in February 2000. The Gurneys made a payment of $43,028 about one month 
before receiving Iron Head's first invoice, dated April 26, 2000, in the amount of 
$49,871. One week later, the Gurneys made their next payment in the amount of 
$51,476. (R. 351.) 
3. The second invoice, dated June 28, 2000 in the amount $49,951.58, was 
paid about a week after presentation. (R. 351.) 
4. Questions first arose about payment with Iron Head's last invoice in August 
2000 ("August Invoice"), after Iron Head had stopped construction. (R. 350-51, 385.) 
4
 The trial in this case was cut short by the parties' settlement, in the middle of 
Iron's Head's presentation of its case in chief, after only its principal (Richard Curtis) and 
banker had testified. As such, the trial evidence is incomplete and of limited value to the 
issues on appeal. However, in connection with their Post Judgment Memorandum Re: 
Attorney Fees, the Gurneys offered an affidavit of their expert, Patrick J. Kilboume, 
CPA, CMA, on the limited matters relevant to Iron Head's request for prejudgment 
interest. This affidavit was not objected to by Iron Head or otherwise stricken by the trial 
court and is, therefore, part of the record on appeal, appearing at R. 337-52. Many of the 
facts cited herein come from this affidavit. 
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5. The August Invoice requested payment of $92,261.62 but failed to credit 
the Gurneys with all of the $136,455 they had already paid to Iron Head and, for the first 
time, asked for payment of an amount in excess of the sum provided in the parties' 
written contract. No change orders had been prepared as required by the contract, and no 
estimates or invoices estimating or confirming the amount of any extra costs had been 
submitted by Iron Head. (R. 334, 351, 385.) 
6. The Gurneys promptly paid $25,000 toward the August Invoice, even 
though it was incomprehensible. For example, this invoice set forth line items that were 
inconsistent with the prior invoices. Items in the August Invoice were also markedly at 
odds with the invoices from and payments to Iron Head's suppliers and subcontractors 
produced by Iron Head in discovery. (R. 349-50, 385.) Importantly, the August Invoice 
was the last invoice furnished to the Gumeys before this action was filed. 
7. There was very little contact between Iron Head and the Gumeys until early 
December 2000, when Iron Head's principal, Richard Curtis, dropped by the Gumeys' 
house to discuss additional amounts Mr. Curtis claimed were owed. (R. 350-51, 385-86.) 
Mr. Curtis testified that he brought to this meeting an invoice dated November 22, 2000, 
which claimed an additional amount due of $82,463.33. Mr. Curtis left without ever 
showing the invoice to Mr. Gumey, however, and the Gumeys first became aware of the 
new invoice through discovery in this lawsuit. Iron Head did not attempt to support the 
invoiced amount as the amount due at trial. (R. 298, 33-334, 350-51, 384.) 
8. After the December 2000 meeting, Iron Head instructed its attorney to file a 
Notice of Lien against the Gumeys' residence in the amount of $119,051.07 plus interest, 
8 
costs, and attorney fees. Notably, the lien amount once again differed from all of the 
previous amounts Iron Head claimed were owed for the construction. Iron Head did not 
attempt to substantiate or support the lien amount at trial. (R. 2-3, 333, 350, 384.) 
9. Iron Head filed suit against the Gurneys on January 5, 2001, alleging four 
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) quantum meruit; (3) unjust enrichment; and 
(4) foreclosure of the mechanics lien. For the first three claims, Iron Head sought 
approximately $71,000 plus profit and interest, while on the fourth claim it sought 
$119,051 plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The Gurneys believe that Iron Head had 
already been fully paid for its work and therefore disputed its claims. (R. 15-23.) 
10. The evidence submitted by Iron Head both before and during trial was 
inconsistent and contradictory. The inconsistent invoices were never explained or 
reconciled, the invoice amounts were not supported by the billing and payment records 
Iron Head provided in discovery, and by the point his cross-examination was interrupted 
by the settlement, Mr. Curtis had admitted that some $16,000 of the amounts Iron Head 
included in its billings were not the Gurneys' responsibility. (R. 349-51, 383.) 
11. On the third day of trial, November 13, 2003, after it became apparent that 
the trial would need to be continued, the parties settled Iron Head's claims for the sum of 
$43,500. The Gurneys paid the negotiated settlement amount in full.5 (R. 315-316, 332-
33.) 
The settlement agreement was read into the record before the trial court and, while 
the settlement agreement was never formally memorialized in a separate writing, its 
terms were recorded in the trial court's Minutes of Bench Trial. (R. 315-16.) 
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12. The settlement was reached during Iron Head's presentation of its case in 
chief, after its banker testified and while its principal was still on the stand, and before the 
Gurneys had an opportunity to present any evidence. (R. 316-22, 384, 392-93.) 
13. The Gurneys did not agree Iron Head was entitled to prejudgment interest 
on the settlement amount. Accordingly, the parties agreed to allow the trial court to 
decide whether Iron Head was entitled to such interest as a matter of law. (R. 315-16.) 
14. Subsequently, the parties submitted briefs on Iron Head's claimed 
entitlement to an award of prejudgment interest. The Gurneys argued that Iron Head was 
not entitled to any recovery, noting that Iron Head's claim for prejudgment interest was 
based on the new November 13, 2003 compromise amount. It was not a liquidated sum 
and was not susceptible to prior calculation before 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. It was a 
"nuisance" compromise, not a "judgment." (R. 323-36, 362-86.) 
15. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Iron Head prejudgment interest at an 
annual rate of 10% on the compromise sum of $43,500, calculated from December 31, 
2000—an arbitrary date months after Iron Head's three bills had been presented to the 
Gurneys but prior to the filing of Iron Head's Complaint—to the date of settlement, in 
total $12,835.48. (R. 387-93; Addendum A and B.) 
16. In awarding prejudgment interest the trial court observed: 
In this case, the amount of damages was disputed until the 
date of settlement, November 12, 2003 [sic]. As of that time, 
the dispute about damages was over and the plaintiffs were 
entitled to recover $43,500.00 from defendants. The 
calculation of interest on that amount is done by formula 
which is based on fixed rules and known standards, namely 
10 
the rate of interest and the amount of time passed since the 
claim arose. 
(R. 388.) As noted, no determination of damages was ever made by the court; the 
"recovery" mentioned was the parties' compromise. 
17. Notwithstanding its acknowledgement that the amount allegedly owed to 
Iron Head was disputed until the date of settlement, the trial court concluded that the 
$43,500 settlement amount was fixed as of an earlier "particular date"—December 31, 
2000—which was prior to the date Iron Head filed its Complaint. The trial court stated: 
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. 
Both sides offered testimony in this case that there was a 
meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney that 
occurred in the Gurney home in early December 2000. This 
is the meeting where Richard testified that he had an invoice 
or printed statement or bill with him, offered to show it to 
Alan, but Alan refused to look at it. It is clear from this 
evidence that no work was done on that project after that date. 
December 31, 2000 is an appropriate date to use to calculate 
the passage of time. The time elapsed between December 31, 
2000 and November 12, 2003 is 3 years minus 18 days, or, 3 
times 365 minus 18, or 1,077 days. 
(R.387-88) (emphasis added). This discussion of Mr. Gumey's conduct was based on 
Mr. Curtis' partial testimony. The court had not heard from Mr. Gurney, who has a 
vastly different recollection. 
18. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of prejudgment interest in a 2-1 
decision, as discussed at pp.4-7, above and further below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award of prejudgment 
interest to Iron Head on the compromise amount of $43,500 for two main reasons. 
11 
First, prejudgment interest is not appropriate on the type of settlement agreement 
at issue in this case. "As established nearly a century ago . . . Utah courts award 
prejudgment interest in cases where damages are complete and can be measured by fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of value." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. 2003 UT 
41, U 17, 82 P.3d 1064 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Here, there were no damages awarded, no finding of liability made and no 
judgment entered against the Gurneys. Likewise, the settlement agreement included no 
admission of fault or any other such stipulation. Instead, the parties settled the case early 
in the trial for $43,500—a sum far lower than Iron Head originally sought. This amount 
represents a compromise and is the product only of the settling parties' discretion, not 
"fixed rules of evidence or known standards of value." Id. As Judge Orme accurately 
observed in the Iron Head dissent, "the rather round sum of $43,500" negotiated to settle 
the claims was not attributable to any amount alleged or evidence produced by Iron Head. 
Iron Head, 2008 UT App at % 25 (J. Orme, dissenting). There was no stipulation, 
contract, receipt, invoice, or class of invoices that formed the basis for the $43,500 
figure. 
Moreover, an award of prejudgment interest requires the "loss" to be fixed as of "a 
particular time." See Smith 2003 UT 41 at f^ 20 (quotations and citation omitted). In 
addition to the fact that Iron Head was never determined to have suffered a "loss," the 
$43,500 sum did not become "fixed" until this new obligation was agreed to by the 
parties on the November 13, 2003 date of settlement. Thus, the "damages" could not 
have been fixed as of December 31, 2000, as the trial court ruled and the Court of 
12 
Appeals affirmed. Furthermore, permitting interest on a compromise amount contravenes 
Utah's policy favoring settlement of disputes because it would penalize stipulating parties 
by exposing them to the additional risk of prejudgment interest. 
Finally, contrary to the Iron Head majority's observation, it is irrelevant that the 
parties' settlement was not "global," in that it left the prejudgment interest issue for 
decision by the trial court as a matter of law. The fact that the parties tried but were not 
able to agree on the prejudgment interest issue does not alter the fundamental character of 
the settlement. There were still no damages awarded, no finding of fault or liability on 
the part of the Gumeys, and the $43,500 the Gurney's paid to Iron Head was still solely a 
product of the parties' discretion. In short, the parties' settlement agreement did not meet 
Utah's legal requirements for the attachment of prejudgment interest, even though the 
agreement was not a "global" one. 
Second, prejudgment interest is not allowed in actions seeking equitable relief 
such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit because of the lack of mathematical 
certainty inherent in these types of claims. See Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah 
County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In the present case, the parties' 
settlement agreement resolved Iron Head's equitable claims for unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit, along with Iron Head's legal claims, without distinction. Nothing in the 
settlement provides that it was intended to resolve only the contract claims. Moreover, 
because Iron Head's bill exceeded the contract amount (which the Gumeys had already 
paid) and there were no change orders, the remaining claims necessarily sounded in 
equity not in contract. 
13 
Accordingly, the award of prejudgment interest on the $43,500 amount paid in 
compromise of the equitable claims was erroneous as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY ONLY BE AWARDED ON DAMAGES 
THAT ARE FIXED AT A PARTICULAR TIME AND CALCULABLE 
WITH MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY. 
Prejudgment interest is not appropriate in all instances. Rather, "[a]s established 
nearly a century ago in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., [32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 
1007 (1907)], Utah courts award prejudgment interest in cases where 'damages are 
complete and can be measured by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value.'" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 17, 82 P.3d 1064 (citing Fell). 
'"[Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when . . . the loss can be measured by 
facts and figures and if the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time.'" Bennett v. 
Huish, 2007 UT App 19, % 43, 155 P.3d 917 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "[A] 
court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a 
mathematical certainty.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
On the other hand, prejudgment interest must be denied if the amount of damages 
is subject to "broad discretion" of the fact finder. Smith, 2003 UT 41 at f^ 20; accord 
Fell, 88 P. at 1007. "[W]here damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage must be ascertained and 
assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not 
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allowed." Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201,1f 64, 71 P.3d 188 (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
Although the Court of Appeals cited these principles, it departed from them in 
affirming the prejudgment interest award. Prejudgment interest is not appropriate in the 
type of settlement agreement at issue here. The case was settled on the third day of trial, 
prior to the presentation of any evidence by the Gurneys. The $43,500 amount the 
Gurneys paid to settle the lawsuit was entirely determined by a compromise of mutual 
inconvenience. There was no finding of liability against the Gurneys, no admission of 
fault, no evidence presented fixing the amount owed to Iron Head for their claims at 
$43,500, and no damages awarded by the trier of fact upon which to anchor a 
prejudgment interest award. As noted, the parties' settlement resolved all of Iron Head's 
legal and equitable claims, without distinction. Utah law precludes an award of 
prejudgment interest for equitable claims because of the discretion involved in fashioning 
damage awards for these types of claims. 
II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT APPROPRIATE ON THE PARTIES' 
$43,500 SETTLEMENT AMOUNT. 
A. Iron Head is Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Settlement 
Amount Where There was No Determination of Liability, No Damages 
Awarded, the Compromise Sum was Not Traceable to y Facts or 
Figures in Evidence, and it Contravenes Utah Public Policy. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest on 
the $43,500 compromise sum, calculated back to December 31, 2000—a date prior to 
Iron Head's filing of the Complaint and months after construction activities had ceased. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals must have determined that Iron Head was damaged or 
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owed $43,500 as of December 31, 2000. While no Utah court has directly addressed this 
issue (other than the Court of Appeals in this case) there are at least four reasons why 
prejudgment interest should not have been awarded on the settlement amount agreed to 
by the parties.6 
1. No damages were awarded. 
An award of prejudgment interest requires "the injury and consequent damages" 
to be "complete" and "ascertained as of a particular time." Smith, 2003 UT 41 at |^ 20 
(emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, no damages were awarded to 
Iron Head and judgment was not entered in favor of Iron Head on any of its four claims. 
To the contrary, the parties settled the case on the third day of trial for a new, 
compromise sum different (and much lower) than any amount claimed by Iron Head. 
The stipulation did not provide for entry of judgment nor was any admission of liability 
made by the Gurneys in connection with the settlement. There was no finding of liability 
by the trial court and no judicial determination of any "loss" suffered by Iron Head. 
Without a stipulation, a judgment, an award of damages, or a finding of liability from a 
particular, prejudgment date, there is no damage figure on which prejudgment interest 
may be based. Cf Carlson Distr. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C
 % 2004 UT App 227, 
6
 The fact that no other court has awarded prejudgment interest on a settlement 
agreement under these circumstances suggests that such an award does not comport with 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In fact, courts which have 
awarded prejudgment interest on settlement agreements have only done so commencing 
from the date the settlement became final, and then only in a subsequent action between 
one of the parties to the settlement agreement and that party's insurance company or 
indemnitee. See, e.g., Nuestrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
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Yf 32-34, 95 P.3d 1171 (refusing to base a prejudgment interest award on an amount 
stipulated to in the party's answer and counterclaim, but instead requiring the interest to 
be based on the amount of damages actually awarded by the jury, because "prejudgment 
interest is awarded to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed," 
and the jury award is the "amount owed" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
2. The settlement amount is not traceable to any facts or figures or known 
standards of value. 
Second, the $43,500 settlement amount is not measurable by reference to any 
"facts or figures" or "known standards of value." See Smith 2003 UT 41 at \ 20 
(quotations and citation omitted). As Judge Orme accurately observed in the Iron Head 
dissent, "the rather round sum of $43,500" negotiated to settle the claims is not 
attributable to any amount alleged or evidence produced by Iron Head. Iron Head, 2008 
UT App at f 25 (J. Orme, dissenting). There was no stipulation, contract, receipt, 
invoice, or class of invoices that formed the basis for the $43,500 figure. To the contrary, 
this figure "is—not unlike an award for pain or suffering or damage to reputation—a 
figure that has essentially been plucked from the air, albeit by the parties rather than the 
jury." Id. As the product solely of the parties' discretion and compromise, $43,500 
includes "the range of imponderables inherent in any settlement decision," including 
avoidance of further legal fees and time lost in litigation, having the property free of a 
lien that limits its marketability, and avoidance of risk inherent in litigation. Id. at ^ 25-
26. The settlement involved no acknowledgment or admission of fault; the Gumeys 
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agreed to pay that sum, approximating the cost of successfully completing the trial on a 
"nuisance" basis, solely to bring an end to the proceedings. 
The Iron Head majority all but ignored the genesis and purpose of the Gurney's 
$43,500 settlement agreement with Iron Head, as evidenced by their observation: 
Here, Iron Head's damages were based upon evidence about 
hours worked, materials, submitted invoices, time cards, bills 
paid, and labor costs. Although the damages Iron Head 
claimed were inconsistent, a fact finder could have 
determined any damage amount based on the evidence 
presented. A jury verdict would not have been based on a 
'"a mere description of the wrongs done or injuries 
inflicted,'" and would have relied upon "fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value." 
Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at f 20 (citations omitted). This reasoning ignores that the 
$43,500 amount the majority deemed as "damages" was not in fact "based upon" 
allegations in Iron Head's complaint nor was it calculated from any combination of 
evidence regarding "hours worked, materials, submitted invoices, time cards, bills paid, 
and labor costs." Iron Head cannot point to any evidence supporting an amount owed at 
$43,500. Id 
Furthermore, no "fact finder" would or could have calculated $43,500 as 
"damages" owed by the Gumeys to Iron Head based only on the partial evidence adduced 
to that point. Rather, this figure was arrived at by the parties in the middle of Iron Head's 
case prior to presentation of any evidence by the Gumeys in order to avoid a lengthy 
continuance. A "fact finder" would not have calculated any damages without first 
receiving and weighing the Gumeys5 evidence. The settlement amount was not known or 
calculable at any time prior to the parties' agreement. 
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1 lit' iiiii|ont> "s nssumplion ihal n pus ifyiven Ihe * limit e i ould have concluded 
from all of the admittedly "inconsistent" evidence adduced to that point that Iron Head 
was entitled to damages in the amount of $43,500 indulges the very speculation forbidden 
h i I H a i l ( ' o u i l ' i I In 11 ii.i 11 mi ill", n in' iH| i mi in 1111 nil III.ml h i ' i J I I I M ' l l i c i i i i i n r v s a g r e e d l o p n \ V I \ SOI) 
to settle the case, this was the amount a fact finder would have found owing to Iron Head 
as of December 31, 2000. The facts do not support such speculation. The settlement was 
simply an agreement to end the case; it inch ided i 10 ado: lissioi i of w roi lgdoing, liability :>i 
I;uiii ni ill - 'p (lie part of the Gurneys. By attempting to guess what might have occurred 
or what a hypothetical jury "could" have awarded on consideration of yet-to-be-adduced 
evidence, the majority employed the type of speculative el tin 1 lli.il pi cellules .IU.II/I\ <MII 
pi eji ldgmei it it iter est 
3, The settlement amount was not fixed as of December 31, 2000. 
An award of prejudgment interest requires the "loss'" to be fixed as of "a partici ilar 
With 'ill. . I ' l lILil'l "I i^uolalionsiind citation omitted). The $43,500 
settlement figure was not, and could not have been, "fixed as of a particular 
[prejudgment] date" of December 31, 2000, as the majority held, See Iron Head, J!(HIN 
I ) I \ pp 1 at "I 9 R at! lei , 1:1: lis i le ' * • ai i :ioi it it A as first "fixed" oi 1 the date the settlement 
was negotiated and read into the record. 
The majority affirms application of the December 31, 2000 date because a meeting 
urnirrnl between mlie pmhe'i ill diilv Deeernber MHhi ,iiinl oc •( nnslriirlion o< nininl inn 
the house after that meeting. See Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at TJ 21 . There is no factual 
or legal basis for this finding. Substantial construction efforts ceased in August, not 
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December. A meeting apparently occurred in early December. Mr. Gurney did not have 
an opportunity to testify about that meeting or about what Mr. Curtis did and said at that 
time. Based upon Mr. Curtis's testimony, however, it is clear that no invoice was 
submitted at that meeting (let alone an invoice for $43,500). (R. 349-51.) 
4. Awarding prejudgment interest on a settlement amount is 
contrary to Utah's public policy favoring settlement 
Finally, an award of prejudgment interest on the parties' settlement, calculated 
back to a date before the settlement occurred, is contrary to Utah's public 
policy of encouraging settlement. See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989). 
("The public policy is to encourage settlements.") 
For example, in Pearson Construction Co. v. Intertherm Incorporated, 566 P.2d 
575, 576 (Wash Ct. App. 1977), the plaintiff filed suit to recover for property damage 
resulting from a fire caused by a defective heater manufactured by the defendant. The 
fire occurred 18 months before the plaintiff filed his complaint, seeking $50,000 in 
property damage and "loss of profits and business reputation in an equal amount." Id. at 
577. On the first day of trial, counsel for the defendant stipulated that damages were 
$51,000. The plaintiff contended that "because of the stipulation and because [the 
defendant] did not contest the claim other than a general denial," the amount claimed was 
liquidated, and he was therefore entitled to prejudgment interest "from the date of the 
fire." Id. The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed, holding: 
7
 The Gurneys raised this issue and cited Pearson Construction in their briefing 
before the Court of Appeals, but it was not addressed by them. 
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A stipulation as to damages at trial does not relate back and 
fix the amount as of the time the cause of action arose, and, 
indeed, it should not. Stipulations are viewed by courts with 
favor, and adoption of the rule advanced by the [plaintiff] 
would penalize stipulating parties by exposing them to the 
risk of prejudgment interest. 
Similarly, allowing prejudgment interest as awarded in the present case, whether 
from December 31, 2000 or otherwise, would have the effect of discouraging settlement. 
discussed above and in more detail below, prejudgment interest is not allowed on claims 
in which damages are discretionary, such as equitable claims. See generally Bellon v. 
Malum KOK P \l IHN'» hlWMUliih |W| ) Kuuitv Ihntmy Imports ?<HH I I'l - i 
201, TJ 64, 71 P.3d 188. If prejudgment interest were to be permitted on amounts 
included in a settlement agreement, there would be no advantage to settling discretionary 
damage claims, a 
prejudgment interest. This would be bad policy and should be rejected by this Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals decision must be reversed and the 
trial court's award of prejudgment interes - . d. 
B, A Global Settlement is Not Required to Preclude Prejudgment Interest. 
In affirming the prejudgment interest award, the majority found compelling that: 
o 
The Pearson decision accords with the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Carlson 
Distribution Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L. C, 2004 UT App 227, ffij 32-34, 95 P.3d 
1171, in that both decisions rejected the idea that prejudgment interest can be based on a 
stipulated amount 
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The parties did not reach a global settlement, ending the 
dispute regarding all their claims. If that had been the case, a 
trial court would not have been justified in awarding 
prejudgment interest at the request of one party. But when 
the parties specifically asked the trial court to determine 
whether prejudgment interest was justified, we believe that 
the approach required by our case law is that the court 
examine the nature of the claims settled, and apply the Fell 
factors. 
Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at f^ 11. Although this is an issue of first impression 
necessitating this Court's attention, the distinction between global and partial settlements 
is not meaningful here. 
The parties here tried hard to settle all disputes. With all their efforts, they were 
able only to compromise the causes of action and defenses raised in the lawsuit; they 
were not able to agree on whether Iron Head was entitled to recover prejudgment interest 
and, instead, submitted that single legal issue to the court. The law does not favor only 
complete compromises; the interests of justice must also favor agreement or compromise 
on a partial basis. See, e.g. Standards 9 and 10, Utah Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility. 
That they were able to settle only part of their claims does not change the 
underlying character of their agreement. The $43,500 the Gurneys paid to Iron Head to 
settle the case was wholly their decision. Though they may have justified it in their own 
ways and in accordance with their individual interests, the settlement amount is not 
traceable to any facts or figures in evidence, no matter which claims were settled. 
Similarly, the fact that Iron Head's entitlement to prejudgment interest was reserved did 
not somehow vest the $43,500 with the character of damages or of a judgment that could 
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somehow k tu* IHXH I IM/ I I pi KH In Ninei i ibn 1 \ .MUM hn l l in inn ic Ihi mine \)u I t lul 
one issue was reserved does not convert a compromise made with no admission of fault 
or stipulation of liability into a settlement based upon such an admission or stipulation. 
The majority seen is to 1: la v e i ecognized tl: lis, ii 11:1 leor ) at least, w i: lei I it ie> ii idicated 
that the court must "examine the nature of the claims settled, and apply the Fell factors." 
Id. As indicated in Section A above, however, the majority misapplied these factors. 
Contrary to the majority's determination, ai i a/v\ ai d of preji iclgi nent interest calculated 
rbitrarily assigned time would not be appropriate on this type of settlement, 
even if it was not a "global" settlement. Such a holding would be contrary to the sound 
policy of encouraging compromise of all claims susceptible of settle! i lei it 
Ill IRON HEAD IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS. 
Prejudgment interest typically is not allowed in actions seeking equitable relief 
such as unjust enrichmenI or tfiuwinw mcnul bt'caust. ml tin I ml ml mi;i(11«»111.ifi< ii 
ceifaility inherent in these types of claims. See, e.g., lieliun v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 
1097 (Utah 1991); Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah 
( "i App \{){)?.\ In Shoreline, the ("'oiuil ol Appeals idtisetl U\ awuml piv|iid|?,menl inlnrsi 
^richment claim, observing: 
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was 
awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in actions for 
damage to personal property, in actions brought on a written 
contract, and in an action to recover a liquidated overpayment 
of water subscription charges. In many of these cases, we 
stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and 
the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of 
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damages. No case has been cited to us where we have 
allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the 
instant case, which is for equitable relief. "A suit of this 
nature . . . invokes consideration of the principles of equity 
which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of 
the trial court." In view of the highly equitable nature of this 
action where the court has discretion in determining the 
amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no 
error in the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Shoreline, 835 P.2d at 211 (emphasis added) (citing Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1097); see also 
James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 671 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating "Utah courts have upheld the denial of prejudgment interest in action seeking . . . 
unjust enrichment"); Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d at 427 (concluding "even 
if quantum meruit is awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded"). 
More recently, in Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 P.2d 
222, a strongly worded opinion, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of 
prejudgment interest because 
In this case, one of the five causes of action Dejavue 
submitted to the jury was an unjust enrichment claim. 
Although the jury awarded Dejavue $90,871 in compensatory 
damages, the general verdict form did not identify the 
specific claims on which the award was based. While an 
award of prejudgment interest might well be appropriate 
under the breach of contract claim, such an award is highly 
problematic with respect to the forcible entry, unlawful 
detainer, and conversion claims. However, it would never be 
appropriate for the unjust enrichment claim presented 
here. In this case, the trial court had no way of knowing 
under which theory or theories of liability the jury awarded its 
verdict. Thus, it was impossible for the trial court to 
determine to what extent if any, the juryfs damage award 
was based on Dejavueys unjust enrichment claim-a claim 
which is not subject to an award of prejudgment interest 
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1 t /. at II 
These general principles should control here. Iron Head filed suit alleging four 
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) recovery in quantum meruit] 
alternative claims and Iron Head did not elect a remedy, either prior to trial or before 
settling its claims. Moreover, because Iron Head's bills exceeded the written contract 
amoun 
required by the contract, the remaining claims necessarily sounded in equity not In 
contract. Nevertheless, the settlement agreement resolved all of Iron Head's claims 
without distinction and without atti ibuting an> of the settle! i let it amoi n it tc bi eacl I of 
contract. 
The Iron Head court recognized this, see Iron Head, 2008 I IT App 1 at 
"I [ 1.2, but it refused to follow the above-cited authorities, attempting ii istead to lit! i lit e acl I 
case tc its facts S< u • It i at J\j 1. 7 1,9 However, the reach of Dejavue and the other cases 
cited above was not restricted to the facts before them. To the contrary, these authorities 
set forth general rules of broad scope. See, e.g., Dejavue, 1.999 I J I App 355 at "f 2 1 
* - *propriate fnr ilic ini|ii>.i nmdtninil claim presented 
here" (emphasis added)); Shoreline, 835 P.2d at 211 ("No case has been cited to us where 
we have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant case, which is for 
i i|inl<ihK i r l i r T (t i i ipli. i ' i i < .ulili t i n M U I I ' U ' H I o < n il I i ill <| In (lit n l iu ls the (in Is ml 
the present case easily fall within their reach, particularly Dejavue. 
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As stated grounds for its decision, the Iron Head majority relied on two opinions 
allowing prejudgment interest on claims for "breach of fiduciary duty," see Smith, 2003 
UT 41 and Bennett, 2007 UT App 19, and its decision in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), which allowed prejudgment interest on a quantum meruit claim 
involving contract implied in fact. Iron Head, 2008 UT App 1 at fflj 13-16. 
These cases are different from the present case. The Davies case, for example, 
distinguished between unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, contract implied in fact and 
law, quasi-contract, and restitution. Davies, 746 P.2d at 268. The court awarded 
prejudgment interest on a quantum meruit claim involving contract implied in fact, which 
it defined as an action "to recover payment for labor performed . . . in which that 
plaintiff, for some reason, would not be able to sue on an express contract." Id. 
Here, unlike Davies, Iron Head did sue on an express contract and also brought 
claims for both unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In addition, in Davies, 
prejudgment interest was awarded following a complete trial with a finding of liability 
and an award of damages based on the evidence. Id. at 266. The present case fits instead 
within the general proscription of Dejavue prohibiting an award of prejudgment interest 
for unjust enrichment. 
This case is also distinguishable from the breach of fiduciary duty cases cited by 
the Iron Head majority. In both Smith and Bennett, prejudgment interest was approved as 
awarded by a jury following a trial because the adjudicated breaches of fiduciary duty 
involved conversion, traceable to a specific date of conversion predating the complaint. 
See Smith, 2003 UT 31 at 1J 23; Bennett, 2007 UT App 19 at fl 27-29, 42-46. Here, 
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tiinr \ N , i, inn. inl|ii<iii iition I HI .iii\ of the claims plead or tried, and the $43,500 settlement 
amount was not fixed to any event or fact in existence prior to November 13, 2003—the 
date it was negotiated. It was error, therefore, to arbitrarily n 
December 31, 2000 as a basis foi pi eji ldgment interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals decision must be reversed and tl ic 
1ii.il uniff1 \\\ null id iiii'iudiiiiH.iil IIIUTCSI hi Inni Hi nil iinr<l h vacated. I lie Gumeys 
further request their costs in accordance with Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
D.ih d (iii 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Aaron D. Lebenta 
Lloyd D. Rickenbach 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST 
Case No. 010600008 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
This case represents a disputed claim foi money to complete a residential const i: uction 
and remodeling project. Plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to money. Defendants said that 
the} ir had paid some mone y , bi it the iixv oices and r ecords w ere incomplete and inconsistent. 
The dispute about money ended on the third day of trial when the parties settled -ihsi* all 
but one of their differences. The settlement was that the defendants agreed to pay a sum of 
money to the Plaintiff. The parties presented their agreement to me in i \ »in1 *mA ! ,ippr« >\ i il it 
No more evidence was presented. The issue of pre-judgment interest was reserved for decision 
b> me. 
The topic of pre-judgment interest was recently treated by the Utah Supreme Court in its 
opinion in Smith v. J ;: airfax Realty, Inc., 2003 t J' 1 41, Utah Supreme Court October 3, 2003 at 
i 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, Case number 010600008, Page -2-
Paragraph 16 and following paragraphs. The principles announced in the Smith v. Fairfax case 
seem to be applicable to the situation here. 
The general rule is that pre-judgment interest is awarded in cases where "damages are 
complete" and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." 
Smith v. Fairfax at Paragraph 17. 
In this case, the amount of damages was disputed until the date of the settlement, 
November 12, 2003. As of that time, the dispute about damages was over and the plaintiffs were 
entitled to recover $43,500.00 from the defendants. The calculation of interest on that amount is 
done by a formula which is based on fixed rules and known standards, namely the rate of interest 
and the amount of time passed since the claim arose. 
The interest rate to be used in the calculation is 10% per year, the so called "legal rate" as 
established by law, Section 15-1-1, Utah Code. 
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. Both sides offered testimony in 
this case that there was a meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney that occurred in the 
Gumey home in early December of 2000. This is the meeting where Richard testified that he had 
an invoice or a printed statement or bill with him, offered to show it to Alan, but Alan refused to 
look at it. It is clear from this evidence that no work was done on that project after that date. 
December 31,2000 is an appropriate date to use to calculate the passage of time. The time 
elapsed between December 31, 2000 and November 12, 2003 is 3 years minus 18 days, or, 3 
Q R D E R Q N M Q T I Q N F Q R P R H - J U U G M E N I DM TEREST, Case number 010600008, Page 3 
times 365 minus 18, or 1,077 days. 
Hence the formula foi calculating interest becomes: $43,500 00 tii lies 10° o per year times 
1,077/365. Applying the mathematical principles to the formula yields the result of $12,835.48. 
It appears to me that pre-judgment interest is allowable under the circumstances presented here. 
I lence, l\ Ir Bagley is directed to prepare an appi opriate order and si lbmit it to tl re coi n t for 
execution in such a way that Mr. Barnes has a way to see it and object to it before it is presented 
to me foi signing. 
Date / ^ i C , 2003 'iXMLU 
Javfd L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
* / • ' ' - • • • • • • * " * 
Certificate of Notification 
On \^uC,. n __, 2003, a copy of the above was sent to 
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201 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2216 | 
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APPENDIX B 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. (Bar No. 7975) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Facsimile: (801) 521-6280 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
-vs- : 
ALAN K. GURNEY and : 
VICKI W. GURNEY, : 
Civil No. 010600008 
Defendants. Judge David L. Mower 
Trial commenced in this case on November 10, 2003 before the Honorable 
David L. Mower. Plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. was represented by its counsel 
of record, Marvin D. Bagley, and two of its representatives, Richard Curtis and Amber 
Curtis, were present during the proceedings. Defendants Alan K. Gurney and Vicki W. 
Gurney appeared in person and were represented by their counsel of record, Edwin C. 
Barnes. 
On the third day of trial, November 13, 2003, Iron Head's first witness was still 
testifying and it was apparent to all that the trial could not be completed within the time 
c,vT;.« n ^ T n : C ; ^ n y - J 
2 0 ^ APR l l i ^& i 6 
CLERK 
allotted. At that time, without completing Iron Head's case and without presentation of 
any evidence by the Gurneys, the parties agreed on terms to compromise all of Iron 
Head's claims, with the exception of its claim for prejudgment interest. The parties 
orally presented their settlement agreement to the Court. In their oral presentation, the 
parties agreed to submit the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest to the Court for 
decision by simultaneous written arguments and submissions. The parties did so and, 
on or about December 16, 2003, the Court issued its Order On Motion for Prejudgment 
Interest, awarding $12,835.48 to Iron Head based upon application of mathematical ~
 (-^ 
principles to the agreed settlement amount. • ^ f€^°^ ^ 
The parties represent in filing this Order that the agreed settlement amount was 
timely paid. Iron Head's claims, having been thus resolved, are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with the exception of the prejudgment interest claim. 
The prejudgment interest payment, in accordance with the Court's ruling and the 
schedule agreed to by the parties, will be due on or before April 14, 2004. Should the 
Gurneys make timely payment of the prejudgment interest amount, the Gurneys may 
submit a form of final Judgment pursuant to which all claims between Iron Head and the 
Gurneys will be completely released and discharged. In the event the Gurneys do not 
pay the prejudgment interest amount on or before April 14, 2004, Iron Head may submit 
a form of final Judgment ordering payment in the amount of $12,835.48 on the basis of 
the Court's December 15, 2003 Order. Iron Head may also, by motion and affidavit(s), 
present the issue of the validity of Iron Head's claimed lien to the Court for a 
determination as to whether the lien is security for that obligation. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN K. GURNEY and 
VICKI W. GURNEY, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CrVTL NO. 010600008 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
This court having issued an Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest on December 16, 
2003, ordering that plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. was entitled to judgment against Alan 
K. Gurney and Vicki W. Gurney for prejudgment interest in the amount of $12,835.48 calculated 
as of November 12, 2003, and defendants having failed to pay plaintiff that amount on or before 
April 14,2004, in accordance with this court's Order dated April 13,2004, and good cause 
appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Iron Head Construction, Inc. against defendants 
Alan K. Gurnery and Vicki W. Gurney jointly and severally in the amount of $12,835.48 
together with post judgment interest at the rate of 3.41% from November 12,2003, until paid. 
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
fl Defendants Alan K. Gurney and Vicki W. Gurney (the Gurneys) 
appeal the trial courtfs award of $12,835 in prejudgment interest 
subsequent to a settlement agreement with Plaintiff Iron Head 
Construction, Inc. (Iron Head). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The Gurneys hired Iron Head to do construction and remodel 
work on their home for the negotiated price of $168,558, pursuant 
to a written contract.1 Construction started in February 2000. 
Over the next several months, according to Iron Head, the Gurneys 
1. The original agreement regarding construction and associated 
costs was an oral agreement based upon a master materials list. 
When a lender required a written agreement to process a 
construction loan, the parties agreed that the materials, labor, 
and costs reflected in the master materials list constituted the 
work to be performed. They accordingly signed an agreement 
stating as much. 
requested changes to the scope of the work, including the 
addition of a new roof, relocating and reinsulating walls, as 
well as additional wiring, plumbing, and drywall work. The 
parties did not memorialize any of the proposed changes in 
writing. The Gurneys paid Iron Head $161,455 for the work 
performed, and work stopped sometime after August 2000 due to a 
dispute over the amount of money owed. At a meeting between the 
parties in early December, Iron Head contends its representative 
brought a final invoice; however, the Gurneys did not review the 
invoice at that meeting and the parties did not reach a consensus 
on payment. 
%3 On December 12, 2000, Iron Head filed a mechanic's lien for 
$119,051 on the Gurneys1 property with the office of the Sevier 
County Recorder. In January 2001, Iron Head filed suit against 
the Gurneys, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, and 
unjust enrichment, and sought to foreclose on the mechanic's 
lien. On the first three claims, Iron Head sought $71,000, plus 
fifteen percent profit and ten percent interest, plus costs and 
attorney fees. After three days of trial in November 2003, 
during Iron Head's case in chief, the parties settled Iron Head's 
claims for $43,500, but reserved for the trial court the issue of 
entitlement to prejudgment interest. The trial court decided, 
based upon the parties' briefs, that the Gurneys owed Iron Head 
$12,835 in prejudgment interest based on the settlement amount of 
$43,500. The trial court ruled that the interest accrued from 
December 31, 2000, because the parties had a meeting in early 
December and no work was performed on the house after that 
meeting. 
|^4 The Gurneys appeal the award of prejudgment interest. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%5 The Gurneys claim that the trial court erred in awarding 
prejudgment interest based upon the settlement of a dispute 
involving both contract and equitable claims. "'A trial court's 
decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a 
question of law which we review for correctness.'" Bennett v. 
Huish, 2007 UT App 19, % 11, 155 P.3d 917 (quoting Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, % 16, 82 P.3d 1064).2 
2. Iron Head's claim that the judgment the Gurneys appealed from 
is not a final order is without merit and we do not address it 
further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) 
(stating that appellate courts "need not analyze and address in 
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised"). 
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ANALYSIS 
%6 In Utah, any analysis of an award of prejudgment interest 
starts with reference to the standard for such awards, 
established a century ago in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 
32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907). The supreme court stated in Fell 
that prejudgment interest should be denied in cases where damages 
are determined by exercising the broad discretion of the fact 
finder, for instance, "[i]n all personal injury cases, cases of 
death by wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases where 
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province 
of the jury to assess at the time of the trial." Id. at 1006. 
More recently, in Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 
P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this court stated the same 
principle this way: "If the jury must determine the loss by 
using its best judgment as to valuation rather than fixed 
standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate." 
Id. at 211. 
%1 In cases where the damages amount is more subject to 
calculation, prejudgment interest may be allowed to compensate 
the wronged party for the use of his or her money during the 
pendency of the dispute. In Fell, the supreme court explained 
the rationale behind such an award: "If he had loaned the money 
to some one [sic], he certainly would be entitled to interest, 
and, if he borrowed it from some one [sic], he would likely have 
to pay interest for its use." 88 P. at 1005. Therefore, when 
prejudgment interest is awarded it is "fto compensate a party for 
the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a 
corollary, to deter parties from intentionally withholding an 
amount that is liquidated and owing.1" Carlson Distrib. Co. v. 
Salt Lake Brewing Co., 2004 UT App 227, \ 32, 95 P.3d 1171 
(quoting Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, % 24, 994 P.2d 817). 
%8 In order to determine whether prejudgment interest should 
attach, Utah courts look to "whether the injury and consequent 
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular 
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value." Fell, 88 P. at 1007. 
|9 The Utah Supreme Court has not disavowed Fell, and has 
reaffirmed its basic tenets in subsequent cases. For example, in 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the 
supreme court endorsed the proposition that prejudgment interest 
is awardable "[w]here the damage is complete and the amount of 
loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures." Id. at 422 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 
(Utah 1991) (stating that prejudgment interest is properly 
awarded when "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and 
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the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages"). 
In other words, prejudgment interest is denied when damages would 
be based on "a mere description of the wrongs done, " Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, i| 22, 82 P.3d 1064 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and should be awarded when the damages 
(1) can be calculated with mathematical accuracy; and (2) are 
complete as of a particular date. See Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1097; 
Bracey, 781 P.2d at 422; Fell, 88 P. at 1007; Bennett v. Huish, 
2007 UT App 19, il 43, 155 P.3d 917; Shoreline, 835 P.2d at 212. 
i]l0 We believe that Fell and its progeny establish the standard 
to be applied to the facts of this case. Because we determine 
that the above analysis is required, we do not agree with the 
Gurneys1 assertion that a prejudgment interest award based on a 
settlement amount is invalid. The Gurneys argue that liability 
cannot be "inferred by the mere fact that the Gurneys agreed to 
pay money to end the dispute." They essentially assert that 
prejudgment interest can never be awarded based upon a settlement 
amount because "an award of prejudgment interest requires, as its 
basis, a finding of liability and an award of damages against the 
party to pay interest." 
fll We disagree with the Gurneys under the facts presented here. 
In this case, the parties settled all of their claims except the 
question of whether the Gurneys owed Iron Head prejudgment 
interest. They specifically reserved this issue for 
determination by the trial court. The parties did not reach a 
global settlement, ending the dispute regarding all their claims. 
If that had been the case, a trial court would not have been 
justified in awarding prejudgment interest at the request of one 
party. But when the parties specifically asked the trial court 
to determine whether prejudgment interest was justified, we 
believe that the approach required by our case law is that the 
court examine the nature of the claims settled, and apply the 
Fell factors. Accordingly, we analyze the Gurneys1 claims and 
determine that the trial court's award of prejudgment interest 
was justified.3 
I. Prejudgment Interest Based upon Equitable Claims 
fl2 The Gurneys claim that prejudgment interest should not be 
awarded in this dispute that included the equitable claims of 
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. They argue that equitable 
claims are categorically not subject to an assessment of 
3. Our dissenting colleague presents logical and intriguing 
observations. However, in the absence of case law to guide us as 
to the impact of a settlement rather than a trial, we believe 
that the issue before us requires analysis. 
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prejudgment interest. The settlement agreement here did not 
specify whether the settlement was based upon Iron Head's 
contract claim or its equitable claims. Therefore we analyze the 
equitable claims because they were implicated in the final 
settlement by virtue of not being explicitly excluded from the 
settlement agreement. 
fl3 Quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims are particularly 
problematic causes of action because they fall somewhere between 
the poles of contract claims and equitable claims. See Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A review of 
Utah's caselaw indicates that our appellate courts have stated a 
presumption against awarding prejudgment interest for equitable 
claims because of the lack of mathematical certainty. See, e.g., 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991) ("No case has 
been cited to us where we have allowed prejudgment interest in an 
action such as the instant case, which is for equitable 
relief.1'). However, most of the cases that both award and deny 
prejudgment interest for legal and equitable claims have analyzed 
the facts of each case in light of the standard established in 
Fell to make the ultimate determination. See, e.g., Christenson 
v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 303, 305, 308 
(Utah 1983) (upholding an award of prejudgment interest for the 
tort of negligent misrepresentation, an outgrowth of the tort of 
common law fraud, because "here, the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and the amount of the loss can be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy.").4 
fl4 Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), provides 
a helpful example of how a prejudgment interest award can be 
based upon a quantum meruit claim. There, this court described 
quantum meruit in a similar construction related dispute as "an 
action initiated by a plaintiff to recover payment for labor 
performed in a variety of circumstances in which that plaintiff, 
for some reason, would not be able to sue on an express contract. 
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable 
written or oral contract exists." Id. at 268. The Davies court 
stated that confusion surrounds quantum meruit claims because 
"courts have used the terms quantum meruit, contract implied in 
fact, contract implied in law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, 
and/or restitution without analytical precision." Id. at 268-69. 
4. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 
P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), provides an example of an exception to the 
exclusion of most torts from prejudgment interest awards, as 
detailed in Fell, i.e., personal injury cases, cases of death by 
wrongful act, assault and battery, etc. See Fell v. Union Pac. 
Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907). 
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Hl5 The Davies court described two branches of quantum meruit, 
(1) contract implied in law, also referred to as unjust 
enrichment or quasi-contract; and (2) contract implied in fact. 
See id. at 269. Both branches are "rooted in justice to prevent 
the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiff's expense." Id. 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
ultimately approved an award of prejudgment interest on a quantum 
meruit claim involving a contract implied in fact. See id. at 
269-70. 
fl6 Other cases also have allowed awards of prejudgment interest 
in cases involving equitable claims. In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc. , 2003 UT 41, 82 P. 3d 1064, the Utah Supreme Court approved 
an award of prejudgment interest where the jury awarded damages 
for breach of the partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary 
duty,5 and conversion. See id. ^% 1, 2, 10, 23. The court 
applied the Fell factors in analyzing whether and when damages 
were complete, declining to decide whether "prejudgment interest 
is always appropriate in breach of fiduciary cases . . . because 
. . . the prejudgment interest awarded was appropriate under the 
Fell standard." Id. t1 19/ 22. Similarly, in Bennett v. Huish, 
2007 UT App 19, 155 P. 3d 917, this court affirmed an award of 
prejudgment interest on a trial court's ruling that defendant 
converted loan proceeds and breached his fiduciary duty. See id. 
fH 28, 33, 46. This court did not address the nature of the 
claims, but affirmed the trial court in ruling that the losses 
were fixed and quantifiable within a mathematical certainty. See 
id. H 46. 
1|l7 Several Utah cases have denied awards of prejudgment 
interest, relying on an analysis of the Fell factors. In 
Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), this court did not allow an award of prejudgment 
interest on an unjust enrichment claim, when the original claims 
were for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust 
enrichment. See id. at 209, 211, 212. The denial was based on 
the possibility of double recovery when the jury award could have 
included such interest. See id. at 211. Although the court 
stated that "prejudgment interest must be sought directly as 
damages in unjust enrichment cases, if at all," id. at 212, 
implying that such damages were not unequivocally precluded, the 
issue addressed was whether "the damages upon which prejudgment 
interest is sought can be calculated with mathematical 
certainty." Id. at 211. 
5. Breach of fiduciary duty is an equitable claim. See In re 
Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Actions for breach 
of fiduciary duty, historically speaking, are almost uniformly 
actions !in equity1", (citing Restatement of Restitution, 
introductory note at 9 (1937))). 
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1|18 Similarly, in Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P. 2d 421 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), this court advised the trial court that "on 
remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded" on a quantum 
meruit claim. Id. at 427. The court stated, "We conclude that 
any damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and 
with accuracy." Id. And in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the supreme court affirmed the denial of 
prejudgment interest on loss of profits, stating: 
The purpose of a prejudgment interest award 
is to compensate a plaintiff for actual loss 
or to prevent a defendant's unjust 
enrichment. There was no unjust gain by the 
insurers in this case, and with the amount of 
uncertainty involved in determining an actual 
loss, it would have been inappropriate for 
the trial court to allow for the addition of 
prejudgment interest. 
Id. at 422. 
1[19 One case, Deiavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp. , 1999 UT App 
355, 993 P. 2d 222, appears to rely more heavily on a presumption 
against prejudgment interest for equitable claims, stating that 
an award of prejudgment interest "would never be appropriate for 
the unjust enrichment claim presented here." Id. % 25. This 
court denied the award, at least in part, because it was 
impossible to determine which of five causes of action, including 
one for unjust enrichment, the jury!s award was based upon. See 
id. We do not believe Deiavue should be read to prohibit 
prejudgment interest for all equitable claims, but should be 
restricted to the facts of that case. Further, such a reading 
would be inconsistent with other cases from both of Utah's 
appellate courts. We therefore decline to extend any presumption 
against prejudgment interest awards for equitable claims as far 
as that argued by the Gurneys in reliance on their interpretation 
of Deiavue. Instead we reiterate the importance of analyzing the 
claim according to whether the "damages are complete" and can be 
"ascertained as of a particular time" and "in accordance with 
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." Fell v. 
Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907). 
A. Mathematical Accuracy 
f20 The Gurneys argue that Iron Head cannot prove that the 
damages were calculable with "mathematical accuracy, " Bennett v. 
Huish, 2007 UT App 19, f 45, because the amount owed was a 
"moving target" until the date of settlement. They claim that 
Iron Headfs bills were disputed, and the pleadings, records, and 
other evidence were conflicting and inconsistent. We do not find 
this argument persuasive. In Huish, we rejected the assertion 
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that the damage amount could not be calculated with mathematical 
certainty when the amount alleged in the complaint was different 
from the amount awarded at trial. See id. tH 44-46. "The fact 
that the parties dispute or reduce the amount of damages does not 
in and of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy." Id. H 45. Here, Iron 
Head's damages were based upon evidence about hours worked, 
materials, submitted invoices, time cards, bills paid, and labor 
costs. Although the damages Iron Head claimed were inconsistent, 
a fact finder could have determined any damage amount based on 
the evidence presented. A jury verdict would not have been based 
on flla mere description of the wrongs done or injuries 
inflicted1" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, K 22, 82 
P. 3d 1064 (quoting San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. v. 
Board of Educ., 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263, 267 (1909)), and would 
have relied upon "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value." Fell, 88 P. at 1007. 
B. Complete and Fixed as of a Particular Date 
f21 Further, we agree with the trial court that the last day of 
December 2000 is an appropriate date from which prejudgment 
interest should begin to accrue. Although the Gurneys are 
correct that the trial court is not authorized to make fact 
findings without a trial, the trial court needed to establish the 
"date payment is due" in order to award prejudgment interest. 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P. 2d 264, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Because 
both sides offered testimony that there was an early December 
meeting where the parties failed to reach consensus, and it was 
undisputed that no construction was performed on the house after 
this meeting, the trial court did not err in choosing the last 
day of December as the date from which prejudgment interest would 
begin to accrue. 
f22 In sum, we affirm the trial court's award of prejudgment 
interest based on the settlement amount. 
amela T. Greenwood, \ . P
Presiding Judge 
\23 I CONCUR: 
Carolyi i /B. McHugh, Judg 
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ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
1(24 This is a tough case. We have no experience with a 
settlement, otherwise complete, that leaves for the trial court 
the single question of prejudgment interest. And the lead 
opinion cites no case dealing with such an atypical scenario. 
Without authority or experience to guide us, we are basically 
freestyling in trying to resolve this appeal. 
f25 I would have little disagreement with my colleagues if, in 
reaching their settlement, the parties stipulated that the amount 
still due under their contract was $43,500. Or if that amount 
was nothing more than the sum of a class of invoices--maybe those 
initialed by the Gurneys; or those attributable to, say, the roof 
expansion; or those incurred between two significant dates. But 
such is not the case. The rather round sum of $43,500 is--not 
unlike an award for pain and suffering or damage to reputation--a 
figure that has essentially been plucked from the air, albeit by 
the parties rather than a jury. As such, it no doubt includes 
some component for unpaid work that the Gurneys think they owe, 
or at least that they are pretty sure the trial court would find 
they owe. But it also includes the value of being spared 
additional days in court, leaving them free to more productively 
spend their time, and of having their property free of a lien 
that limits its marketability. It also includes potentially 
significant amounts allocable to stanching the flow of additional 
bills for attorney fees and to avoiding the risk in any 
litigation of a judgment reflecting a worst-case scenario. 
1|26 My problem, then, is a very simple one. I cannot tell how 
much of the settlement amount, if any, is for the kind of thing 
that may warrant an award of prejudgment interest and how much 
reflects the range of imponderables, inherent in any settlement 
decision. Iron Head, as the party who would benefit from the 
determination, bore the burden of establishing "the factual 
predicate supporting [its] claim for prejudgment interest." 
Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, K 43, 993 P.2d 191. In the odd 
posture of this case, it clearly failed to do so. I would 
therefore vacate the award of prejudgment interest 
Gregory^K. Orme, Judge 
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